J.R. Smith Dunk Mix

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

A Basketball Economics Lesson

A BASKETBALL ECONOMICS LESSON IN BRIEF
No team should ever go over the luxury tax threshold unless the owner has the "financial stamina and courage" to avoid suddenly offloading salary to completely eliminate the tax in about one year flat. If there is any chance of the owner cutting and running from the luxury tax in the future, than that owner and that team needs to remain below the luxury tax threshold at all times. At the very least, that owner and that team needs to refrain from going over the luxury tax threshold by more than 5% of the threshold, about $3.5 Million dollars recently.

The Nuggets were almost $13 Million over the luxury tax threshold in 2007-08, a hefty level that only an owner who knew for sure in advance he could continue to pay the tax for at least 2-4 more years (with the tax going down each year) had any business being at.

Because if you get into a situation where the team's salary is so high that it is more than about $6 million or more over the luxury tax threshold, and the owner, for whatever reason, can't stand paying the luxury tax all of a sudden, and decides to stop paying it at all costs, then the necessary cut in the team payroll is huge, and so the cost in basketball terms can end up being the destruction or near destruction of the basketball team, when having a good team was the reason for paying the tax in the first place.

If you do in fact make a huge cut at once, you lose most or all of the side benefits of having paid the tax in the first place, such as the ability to attract quality players to your team at discounted salaries. Because when the team is carved up, quality players aren't going to be very interested in it anymore. Not to mention that your offensive and defensive schemes are now history, and you have to start almost from scratch with them.

As you can see below, in recent years, both the salary cap and the luxury tax threshold have been going up at roughly $3 million each year. This means that if you wanted to back out from paying the luxury tax, and you simply kept the same team total payroll from one year to the next, the luxury tax would go down by roughly $3 million each year. Very little damage would occur if you did it this way.

Alternatively, if you reduced the payroll slightly in a year, by say $3 million, than your luxury tax would go down by $6 million that year. So if you reduced the team payroll by about $3 million over two straight years, and the luxury tax threshold went up by $3 million each year over those two years, than you could in two years go from being almost $13 million over the luxury tax threshold, to being less then $1 million over the luxury tax threshold. This would cause some damage, but not devastation, to the basketball team. If you had a good front office, the damage could be relatively small.

Reducing total team payroll by about $3 million per year is the fastest you can reduce it without doing serious damage to the team. Ideally, you should never reduce team payroll from one year to the next at all, assuming that the NBA salary cap and the NBA luxury tax threshold have not themselves gone down, which, outside of a depression, is almost certainly not going to happen.

Why is $3 million the maximum possible reduction to avoid serious damage? Because that is about 5% of the total payroll, and represents a smart rule to follow if you feel you have gone hog wild, and you now want to stop paying the luxury tax. You can keep the damage to a relatively low level if when you cut the team payroll, you never cut it by more than about 5% per year. Any cut in excess of 5% means that you are doing serious damage to the team. Any cut in excess of 10% means that you are in all likelihood devastating the team.

This is what the Nuggets are apparently doing right now. They are cutting such a high percentage of the team payroll all at once, that they are completely self-destructing their team.

A 5% cut in payroll is actually a roughly 10% payroll cut, relative to the salary cap and the luxury tax threshold, which have been going up by about 5% in recent years. That is the maximum cut you can risk without for sure doing serious damage to the basketball team. Were you to cut the team payroll by 10%, it would really be a roughly 15% payroll cut, relative to the salary cap and the luxury tax threshold. There is virtually no way that the team will not be severely damaged with a 10% actual and 15% real, relative cut in payroll.

Keep in mind that a very well managed team would seldom have to reduce their total payroll at all, either because they were able to go about their business without ever paying any luxury tax, or because if they were paying a luxury tax they never panicked and decided to stop paying the tax all at once, and/or because they at the very least were smart enough to reduce team payroll at a careful rate, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

The offloading of Marcus Camby's salary is a textbook example of what not to do, and is smoking gun evidence that the Nuggets franchise is not being managed correctly. Mr. Kroenke can gradually reduce his luxury tax and avoid being considered a failed owner, but he can't make a sudden, massive, huge cut in the team payroll and avoid that tag.

NBA SALARY CAP BY YEAR
2008-09 $58.68 Million
2007-08 $55.63 Million
2006-07 $53.135 Million
2005-06 $49.5 Million
2004-05 $43.9 Million
2003-04 $43.8 Million
2002-03 $40.3 Million
2001-02 $42.5 Million
2000-01 $35.5 Million
1999-2000 $34 Million
1998-99 $30 Million
1997-98 $26.9 Million
1996-97 $24.4 Million
1995-96 $23 Million
1994-95 $15.9 Million
1993-94 $15.1 Million
1992-93 $14 Million
1991-92 $12.5 Million
1990-91 $11.9 Million
1989-90 $9.8 Million
1988-89 $7.2 Million
1987-88 $6.2 Million
1986-87 $4.9 Million
1985-86 $4.2 Million
1984-85 $3.6 Million

Teams being over the cap is the norm, because it is a soft cap, and there are numerous "exceptions" that can be used for a team to legally go over the cap.

On the other hand, if a team goes way over the cap, than the luxury tax kicks in. The luxury tax rule has only been in effect as from 2002-03. The tax owed is the amount by which a team's total salary exceeds the luxury tax threshold.

HISTORY OF THE NBA LUXURY TAX THRESHOLD
NBA LUXURY TAX THRESHOLD BY YEAR
2008-09 $71.15 Million
2007-08 $67.865 Million
2006-07 $65.42 Million
2005-06 $61.7 Million
2004-05 0
2003-04 $54.6 Million
2002-03 $52.9 Million


NUGGETS SALARIES 2002-08

NUGGETS 2007-08 SALARIES
1 Allen Iverson $19,012,500
2 Kenyon Martin $13,250,000
3 Carmelo Anthony $13,041,250
4 Marcus Camby $11,250,000
5 Nene Hilario $8,840,000
6 Eduardo Najera $4,952,380
7 Steven Hunter $3,248,000
8 Chucky Atkins $3,000,000
9 J.R. Smith $2,134,067
10 Anthony Carter $1,103,225
11 Linas Kleiza $1,011,360
12 Von Wafer $770,610
13 Bobby Jones $687,456
14 Yakhouba Diawara $687,456
15 Taurean Green $427,163
16 Mike Wilks $162,281
17 Jelani McCoy $151,089
TOTAL 83,728,827

NUGGETS 2006-07 SALARIES
1 Allen Iverson $17,184,375
2 Kenyon Martin $12,068,182
3 Marcus Camby $8,800,000
4 Nene Hilario $8,000,000
5 Carmelo Anthony $4,694,041
6 Eduardo Najera $4,571,428
7 Reggie Evans $4,000,000
8 J.R. Smith $1,387,560
9 Steve Blake $1,330,000
10 Linas Kleiza $945,360
11 DerMarr Johnson $865,063
12 Jamal Sampson $771,331
13 Ivan McFarlin $412,718
14 Yakhouba Diawara $412,718
15 Jefferson Sobral $75,000
TOTAL $65,517,726


NUGGETS SALARIES 2005-06
1 Kenyon Martin $10,636,364
2 Marcus Camby $9,150,000
3 Andre Miller $8,100,000
4 Earl Watson $5,000,000
5 Eduardo Najera $4,190,476
6 Carmelo Anthony $3,713,640
7 Voshon Lenard $3,520,000
8 Nene Hilario $3,039,889
9 Earl Boykins $2,750,000
10 Greg Buckner $1,670,000
11 Julius Hodge $1,148,760
12 Bryon Russell $1,138,500
13 Linas Kleiza $879,360
14 DerMarr Johnson $835,810
15 Francisco Elson $719,373
TOTAL $56,492,172


NUGGETS SALARIES 2004-05
1 Kenyon Martin $9,454,546
2 Marcus Camby $8,500,000
3 Andre Miller $7,366,667
4 Eduardo Najera $3,809,524
5 Carmelo Anthony $3,471,360
6 Voshon Lenard $3,250,000
7 Nikoloz Tskitishvili $2,910,600
8 Earl Boykins $2,500,000
9 Nene Hilario $2,260,280
10 Rodney White $1,797,845
11 Wesley Person $1,600,000
12 Bryon Russell $1,100,000
13 Greg Buckner $870,046
14 Mark Pope $870,046
15 DerMarr Johnson $745,046
16 Francisco Elson $620,046
17 Luis Flores $385,277
18 Arthur Johnson $385,277
TOTAL $51,896,560


NUGGETS SALARIES 2003-04
1 Marcus Camby $7,250,000
2 Andre Miller $6,400,000
3 Carmelo Anthony $3,229,200
4 Jon Barry $3,000,000
5 Voshon Lenard $2,750,000
6 Nikoloz Tskitishvili $2,721,000
7 Earl Boykins $2,500,000
8 Nene Hilario $2,256,000
9 Rodney White $1,947,600
10 Michael Doleac $1,500,000
11 Ryan Bowen $1,250,000
12 Mark Pope $689,000
13 Jeff Trepagnier $639,000
14 Chris Andersen $639,000
15 Chris Marcus $367,000
16 Francisco Elson $366,931
TOTAL $37,504,731


NUGGETS SALARIES 2002-03
1 Juwan Howard $20,152,000
2 Marcus Camby $6,750,000
3 Nikoloz Tskitishvili $2,530,000
4 Nene Hilario $2,099,000
5 Shammond Williams $1,970,000
6 Rodney White $1,820,520
7 James Posey $1,723,606
8 Ryan Bowen $1,111,111
9 Mark Bryant $1,030,000
10 John Crotty *$1,030,000
11 Chris Whitney $1,000,000
12 Donnell Harvey $992,040
13 Mark Blount $763,435
14 Jeff Trepagnier *$512,435
15 Kenny Satterfield *$512,435
16 Chris Andersen $512,435
17 Predrag Savovic $349,458
18 Junior Harrington $349,458
19 Adam Harrington *$349,458
20 Devin Brown *$349,458
21 Vincent Yarbrough $349,458
TOTAL $43,502,521

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

2008-09 Toronto Raptors Real Player Ratings From the 2007-08 Regular Season

EDITORIAL NOTES FOLLOW

This was done when I was thinking seriously of continuing to cover just one team, and of switching from the Nuggets to the Raptors...

RAPTORS REAL PLAYER RATINGS-2007-08 Regular Season
The Numbers in front are the NBA ranks out of the best 330 players in the NBA

16 Chris Bosh, Tor PF 1.036
38 Jose Calderon, Tor PG 0.914
55 Jermaine O'Neal, Tor C 0.868
109 Kris Humphries, Tor C 0.782
163 Jamario Moon, Tor SF 0.705
176 Carlos Delfino, Tor SG 0.694
199 Anthony Parker, Tor SG 0.676
221 Joey Graham, Tor SF 0.655
228 Andrea Bargnani, Tor PF 0.647
314 Jason Kapono, Tor SF 0.561

Jawai and Ukic are rookies and have no ratings yet. Brezec did not play in enough games to be rated.
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EDITORIAL INFORMATION
This is more forum commentary I did during July 2008, when I didn't have time to do the detailed and extensive reports that I like to do, All commentary until just before the Camby giveaway in July 2008 was already posted in October. The remaining forum commentary not yet here is being posted now.

The posting of my original content on a forum before it is posted on this site will never happen again. Even if my time temporarily becomes limited so that I can't do full reports for a few weeks, I now do Fast Break postings on this site, and these are going to be the same thing as any forum postings I do. I will combine extremely short forum comments into a single Fast Break, which will be from now on immediately be posted here.

In turn, Full Reports will include all fast breaks, which will be reedited and substantially added to.

In these comments, and in future Fast Break writings, do not look for the usual huge amount of detail and proof that you see in a full report here at The Quest for the Ring. Some of this is more like everyday conversation than like top quality sports writing. On the other hand, some of the comments do include some detailed reasoning and proof that I pride myself on in the regular reports.

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

The Self Destruction of the Denver Nuggets: Written July 18, 2008

SEE EDITORIAL NOTES AT THE END IF YOU ARE A REGULAR READER

What the Nuggets owner and front office have done was malpractice on all of the players, but especially on AI, on Camby, and on the Denver fan base. At this point, everyone is arguing about what exactly their mistakes were, and which mistakes were the worst ones. As someone who always takes in and considers all facts and all arguments, my head is spinning with respect to how I would best describe how the Nuggets have now most likely screwed up their team for the foreseeable future. There is so much to say on that topic that it is difficult to figure out how to organize the discussion!

But this experience of covering the Nuggets has been good for me, because now I will be much better equipped to spot mistakes that another team might be making. The Nuggets may have succeeded at making half of or more than half of all of the possible mistakes a basketball team can make in about 4 years flat. So although I am royally angry at those who in the end made my head spin trying to keep track of all of the mistakes and trying to rank the mistakes in order of importance, I am actually very glad I did this, because I am now more or less an expert on the dark side of basketball, so to speak, lol.

So was I punked? No way. But I suspect it is time for me to move to the brighter lights of the basketball world.

George Karl, and as we now know, the Denver management as well, are men of many mistakes, but there is a common denominator to many of them: they value style over substance. They value personality over performance. They value things like practice and good citizenship over things like intensity of effort and application of basketball skills in games. They value hope and the expenditure of money itself over the hard and tricky work of managing an investment all the way to its logical conclusion.

They act as if managing a basketball franchise is like cooking up some instant rice. The Nuggets way of thinking is old school to put it nicely, hopelessly out of date to put it realistically. Their way of thinking fails in Real World 2008, as we have seen. The ultimate irony for the Nuggets management is that they live in that place that their selected Coach, George Karl, accused JR Smith of living in: Fantasyland.

Allen Iverson was fooled into believing that the Nuggets were truly capable of contending, but they never were. But he was not by a long shot the only one fooled. People everywhere looked at Denver and saw a team that had shelled out mega bucks and had a mega talented lineup as a result. Not very long ago, it didn't occur to a lot of folks that the Nuggets might not know how to manage that investment through its logical course, or that they might not use all of the resources that their investment made available to them.

Iverson, and many others besides him, could not have imagined that the Nuggets would have proved to be as lame an organization as they finally revealed themselves to be. Because lame organizations normally don't spend money like its water, so the Nuggets committed fraud on an unsuspecting public, so to speak, when they spent the huge bucks.

And there have been, to my surprise and consternation, a larger number of basketball watchers who have agreed with the Nuggets way of thinking. They look at Marcus Camby’s style and they say to themselves: “I definitely do not want to see his style at the center position, or any other position, for that matter. They look at Allen Iverson's style and say to themselves: "I definitely do not want to see his style at the PG position. I’m just going to continue to enjoy having a field day criticizing his style while he plays as the shortest 2-guard in history. Because I love criticizing players, and especially their styles, while ignoring the contexts.” Such is their twisted thinking.

They are silent on what really matters, which is whether if you add the benefits and subtract the costs of Camby at the center position, or of Iverson at the point guard position, the Nuggets are better off or not. Either they don't know how to calculate that, or they do and refuse to calculate it or consider it. For them, it is style over substance, nothing more and nothing less.

The answer to whether the Nuggets blew it by not running the Iverson/JR Smith backcourt is of course yes, which in my opinion should be obvious. But anyone wanting proof can get overwhelming proof from, for example, reviewing +/- statistics for various on court combinations. Or they can simply "watch the games" as they say, and watch Iverson doing what a point guard does, although with a style that many do not like in the least.

These people are now in effect agreeing that it would be alright for a man, suspecting his life was ruined despite his still having untried options, and so not knowing his life was ruined for certain, to drive to a funeral home, jump in a coffin, and tell the funeral director to bury him right away.

It is one thing to put style over substance. But now at this point, with the Nuggets in self--destruct mode, those who are persisting with this claim have in effect gone off the extreme deep end. Some of the folks who are so adamant about putting style over substance are now excusing the Nuggets for not even attempting to see their huge investment through to its true conclusion, and for not trying every relevant strategy that their expensive roster allowed them to try. Specifically, it is so important to them that Allen Iverson never plays PG for the Nuggets, that by saying the Nuggets should immediately cut and run, they are in effect willing to do any or all of the following:

1. Condemn the Nuggets to being a losing team for the foreseeable future, by saying the Nuggets had no business putting Iverson on the team in the first place, and didn't know what they were doing when they spent the big roster bucks. As if they are qualified to determine and judge those things...
2. Condemn the owner of the Nuggets, Stan Kroenke, to having wasted 20-200 million dollars (depending on what you want to count as part of the loss) on the 2004-08 Nuggets, without even running the experiment to see if Iverson could have played PG for the Nuggets. Kroenke is just supposed to declare his money lost and to cut and run, without seeing his investment through to its logical conclusion. In other words, he is supposed to admit he is a failure as an owner and move on. (Trouble is, even if he admits he is a failure, he is still the owner and is not moving on.)
3. Condemn the Nuggets front office as in over its head in managing an NBA franchise.
4. Condemn the fans of the Nuggets to being punked by the owner and the management of the Nuggets, who are as we speak committing a fraud on them by not admitting that they have given up on being a contender.
5. Condemn Allen Iverson himself to having been punked by the Nuggets organization. Iverson was treated more or less like a circus side show, if the truth were told in full, which it will be by yours truly in the months ahead.
6. Condemn Marcus Camby, an historical defensive player whether you like his style or not, to being, as he himself put it, disrespected. Marcus Camby was in fact disrespected by the Nuggets, pure and simple. Is it any surprise that a lame organization that does not value substance much is guilty of disrespecting him? (How many blocks and rebounds did that man make, again?)
7. Condemn Carmelo Anthony to being stuck in an NBA backwater if he never wakes up and realizes he must come down from the Rockies if he is ever going to be truly respected in the USA, as he already is outside of the USA.

That is way, way too much condemning for me. So sorry, but I condemn those who are doing the condemning. To me, anyone who thinks that style is more important than substance in basketball, and who thinks that you need not bother exhausting all of the main possibilities before declaring your investment lost and your chances for success gone, by cutting and running, is not a true, or at least not a complete basketball fan. I think those who are saying that there is nothing more for the Nuggets to do at this juncture are as wrong as wrong can be.

In summary, although it is apparently true that the Nuggets franchise is a joke, it is even more outrageous in my estimation that there are those who say that the Nuggets must simply declare themselves to be failures, declare their mistakes and failures, and cut and run from what they did over the last several years. In the opinion of the condemners, the Nuggets are so incompetent that they are not even entitled to wait until the prime time for getting a return on their investment is over. They are supposed to, or at least be excused for, immediately giving up and moving on to the losing seasons to come that they so richly deserve. In other words, this fake end of the road is good enough for the imposter basketball fans.

This raise the white flag thinking is totally wrong. People learn, they change, and they get better over time. And there are things that happen by sheer chance that change things dramatically.

Had the Nuggets not self destructed, they could have convinced a key free agent or two or three to come to play for them at a discounted salary. They could have profited from Iverson on his own deciding to score less and pass more, which he hinted he might do recently. They could have, even if by accident, developed a new younger player or two. Carmelo Anthony, JR Smith, and Allen Iverson might have gotten together and worked out a new scheme without needing any coaching to do that. Hell, Anthony Carter could have been injured, and Atkins unable to play due to age and prolonged injury recovery, making it mandatory that Iverson be the point guard by default.

Although I discovered Nuggets errors just about everywhere I looked, I never condemned their efforts, I never assumed they could never get some things right. And I sure as hell never called for them to give up early and to declare themselves to be failures. I knew that the secrets of the quest for the ring are sometimes discovered by chance, or because it was meant to be. And that what is needed in the quest for the ring often appears out of nowhere, when you least suspect it. The Boston Celtics know what I am talking about.

So the only ones I condemn are the condemners, and I blame them in part for the Nuggets' self-destruction.
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EDITORIAL INFORMATION
This is more forum commentary I did during July 2008, when I didn't have time to do the detailed and extensive reports that I like to do, All commentary until just before the Camby giveaway in July 2008 was already posted in October. The remaining forum commentary not yet here is being posted now.

The posting of my original content on a forum before it is posted on this site will never happen again. Even if my time temporarily becomes limited so that I can't do full reports for a few weeks, I now do Fast Break postings on this site, and these are going to be the same thing as any forum postings I do. I will combine extremely short forum comments into a single Fast Break, which will be from now on immediately be posted here.

In turn, Full Reports will include all fast breaks, which will be reedited and substantially added to.

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

The Marcus Camby Giveaway: Forum Comments From July 2008, Part 6

EDITORIAL NOTES FOLLOW

This particular set of comments is my reaction to the Marcus Camby giveaway.
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JULY 2008 FORUM COMMENTARY ON THE NUGGETS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THEIR MISTAKES

Well, the Nuggets are saying "screw everyone who thinks winning a playoff is so important," because Camby is apparently out the door in a payroll butchering move. The Nuggets are apparently getting only a 2nd round pick for Marcus Camby!

Thus ends the whole confusing and all too lame management of the Nuggets failed attempt to put Allen Iverson into position to win a ring.
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The Nuggets are literally making fools of themselves. As I said before, they should have drafted a center.

They are getting only a miniscule amount for Camby, as the ESPN flash has it (posted at 11:32 eastern time, just a few minutes before me, lol). I hope the Camby haters are happy, although in fairness I doubt many of them will agree with this self-destruction of a team.

The correct move was to dismantle the coaching staff and either:

1. Assuming that Nene is really going to be healthy and play, draft the best center possible. Then and only then could you do what the Nuggets are doing (getting the big payroll cut) without looking like total, complete idiots.
or
2. Trade Camby + ??? for a center if Nene is still not certain to be available full time.
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I was really, really, really mad...

Thanks for showing up at the Nuggets funeral, lol.

The Nuggets players don't deserve this either.

To me the most important positions are center and point guard. Now the Nuggets are going to have both of those completely hosed up.

What a freaking joke this is. The Denver front office is saying, "OK, we know we are a relatively small market, and for mainly that reason, it's not meant to be in anyone's life time that we win a Championship, or get close to it really, and we got carried away with the payroll and all..."

Idiots, pure and simple.
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Even writers and bloggers who wouldn't have been caught dead not so long ago saying it should be AI at 1-guard and JR at 2-guard are now saying it. But if wouldn't matter if every single fan and every single writer insisted that AI and JR should be the backcourt starters. George Karl's vote is the only vote that matters, and his style and manners manual says no way to that combo.

So I personally don't think that the Nuggets will even get the consolation prize of an extremely dynamic and successful starting backcourt, because I think it's going to be Carter at 1-guard and AI at 2-guard. So Smith can be the best young SG since time begain, but he ain't gonna start.

So the Nuggets are going to be a total joke, and they have completely self destructed at this point. It is a suicide, and once the grim reaper arrives on the scene, the party is definitely over.
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Karl is upset about any of his older veterans going; he'd have the oldest team in the League if he had his way.

My mind is still spinning around about this, so I am going to use a wider range, for now, for my prediction. I'll change my prediction later if necessary.

That said, I'm gonna say the Nuggets will win just 34-41 games if JR does not start most of the year, and 42-47 games if he does start all year. Even if JR did start for the whole year, the Nuggets probably will not make the playoffs, or its 50/50 at best.
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If I was forced to predict the exact record, I'd say it will be 37-45 if JR does not start during most or all of the season, and 44-38 if he does start most of the year.

With the kind of defense the Nuggets are going to have now (I don't even want to think about it) even starting JR Smith will not be enough for the Nuggets to ensure a playoff spot, let alone win a playoff.

If Nene doesn't play, you could be looking at a 30-33 win team.
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How do you give JR 28+ minutes, while refusing to start him?

If AI plays even just 38, which would be shockingly low, you would have two 2-guards for 66, meaning that you would, under your and Coach Karl's theory that AI is not a good PG (and under my theory too, which is that just saying he is the PG is not enough) be without an effective PG for 18 minutes out of a 48 minute game! How can you possibly expect to win close games without a true, responsible, designated PG for 18 out of 48 minutes?
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The owner of the Nuggets is apparently going from one extreme to the other in his funding of the Nuggets, from being well over the payroll cap to being under it. It may be a full crash and burn of the payroll, which automatically puts the team into rebuilding mode, whether rebuilding is intended or not.

If cutting the money itself is the objective and the plan, and the rebuilding is an accident, then this is about the worst thing any basketball franchise could possibly do: a sudden, unplanned, out of the blue rebuilding, with much of the public unaware that a rebuilding is underway, and possibly parts of the front office and coaching staffs unaware that a rebuilding is underway by default.

But how could a team possibly do a rebuilding correctly if some, most, or all of the management is not aware that this is a full rebuilding situation? They couldn't. You can't do any project correctly if you don't even know that you are involved in that project. At least Oklahoma City knows they are in rebuilding!

A rebuilding that has not been anticipated and planned is a rebuilding that has a much highly likelihood of failing than a planned rebuilding. Success of any Nuggets rebuilding is even more unlikely given that Karl is well known for being stingy toward and biased against younger players, who are obviously crucial in any rebuilding.

If my description of the situation here is even half right, then this 2008 off season is an unmitigated disaster for the Nuggets franchise and will lay them low for an unknown number of years.
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No one is going to begrudge Mr. Kroenke's right to stop paying the luxury tax, but everyone is eligible, to say the least, to criticize dumping a player of Marcus Camby's caliber.

It is ridiculous to say that the Nuggets could not have gotten more for Camby. They could have traded their 2008 pick (#20 in the draft I think) and Camby for a higher draft pick center, as any one of several dozen possible better scenarios. That way, you get a decent center prospect and substantial cap relief at the same time, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater as the Nuggets are actually doing.

Although Nene is 6-11, he is rated a PF; he doesn't have the hands and polished finishing skills to be a true center and may never have them. But nor does he have any kind of outside shot that a good PF is supposed to have.

The Nuggets never really "experimented" with AI, not only because they had one of the least organized offenses in the League, but also because they didn't deviate in the slightest from the way the 76'ers deployed Allen Iverson. In other words, the 76'ers already ran the experiment, and it failed. If you run the same experiment again, it will fail again.
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Well very simply, if you are all of a sudden running away from the luxury tax like a scared rabbit, you had no business piling up a fat luxury tax in the first place. If you are afraid of fire, stay out of the kitchen.

Is one of the main secrets behind which franchises are run well and which are not in the NBA whether there is consistency over many years relative to how much luxury tax, if any, an owner is comfortable with? Apparently so.
__________________________________________________
There was this guy who was supporting the Nuggets view of the World and I could not resist going all out to point out why he was wrong. He said:

I don't think the Nuggets are running away from the luxury tax like a scared rabbit. I see their moves as rational given the situation. They seemed willing to pay the LT if they could be a real contender, if not champion. Given they paid the LT, acquired AI, paid big bucks to Nene to keep him, paid Camby, paid Melo, etc., they reached a logical end. I don't know that adding any player, except for a small handful, was somehow going to push them over the top.

The point being, why pay the LT and lose when you can not pay the LT and lose? (or should I say, win about the same # of games)

I responded:

The Nuggets are not allowed to conclude that they reached a logical end, for the following reasons:

1. From a what we officially know perspective, there hasn't been one word, nor one hint of a word, in public, about the Nuggets reaching an end to their big payroll roster adventure. Quite to the contrary, Nuggets management has been consistent in saying that they are still on course to being a contender. Is this a stealth rebuilding or something?
2. From a basketball strategy perspective, the Nuggets could not possibly be at a logical end unless they actually, really, fully deployed Allen Iverson at the PG position, instead of just inserting him in that slot for the playoffs, for grins only.
3. From a performance measure perspective, you can't possibly say that one of the very most talented teams in the NBA has reached a logical end and has to begin rebuilding. Would Boston, Los Angeles, or at least a dozen top NBA franchises be caught dead doing such a thing?
4. From the actual basketball results strategy, the Nuggets won 50 out of 82 games in 2007-08, one of their highest total number of wins ever. Moreover, the gap betwen their offensive efficiency and defensive efficiency in 2007-08 was substantially up from the year prior, and was one of their most positive gaps ever. You are not at the logical dead end when you have just completed your best season in many, many years.

In short, you have to wait until you are actually at the logical dead end until you take drastic action as a result of being at the logical dead end. The Nuggets are acting as if they are paranoid about finding out whether they were about to reach the logical dead end, which is ridiculous.

This is about like a man, suspecting that he is going to die soon, going to the funeral home, jumping in a casket, and telling the funeral director to bury him now! Laugh out loud!
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There will be more Nuggets post Camby comments in the in "Forum Comments From July 2008, Part 7"
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EDITORIAL INFORMATION
This is more forum commentary I did during July 2008, when I didn't have time to do the detailed and extensive reports that I like to do, All commentary until just before the Camby giveaway in July 2008 was already posted in October. The remaining forum commentary not yet here is being posted now.

The posting of my original content on a forum before it is posted on this site will never happen again. Even if my time temporarily becomes limited so that I can't do full reports for a few weeks, I now do Fast Break postings on this site, and these are going to be the same thing as any forum postings I do. I will combine extremely short forum comments into a single Fast Break, which will be from now on immediately be posted here.

In turn, Full Reports will include all fast breaks, which will be reedited and substantially added to.

In these comments, and in future Fast Break writings, do not look for the usual huge amount of detail and proof that you see in a full report here at The Quest for the Ring. Some of this is more like everyday conversation than like top quality sports writing. On the other hand, some of the comments do include some detailed reasoning and proof that I pride myself on in the regular reports.

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

Real Coach Ratings: As of October 2008: the Sub Ratings

Two days ago, on Sunday, November 16, 2008, I posted the first ever Real Coach Ratings. Then in the last couple of days I extracted a lot more from the underlying data by organizing the data in ways that break down the data in really revealing ways. Specifically, I have broken down the overall Real Coach Ratings into three Sub Ratings. While some coaches are near the top on all three sub ratings, others, such as George Karl, rate very high on one Sub Rating but very low on another one. For the original Real Coach Rating article, which includes an extensive User Guide, visit here.

The Quest for the Ring put the complete and final Real Coach Ratings spreadsheet on the internet! To view this spreadsheet which shows all of the underlying data, and all of the Real Coach Rating organization of that data, you can visit here.

Here we will now proceed to report the sub ratings. But befiore we actually get to the sub ratings, let's review the overall Real Coach Ratings:

REAL COACH RATINGS
As of October, 2008, before the 2008-09 season began
A User Guide Follows

1 Los Angeles Lakers Phil Jackson 5071.8
2 San Antonio Spurs Gregg Popovich 2824.0
3 Utah Jazz Jerry Sloan 1277.3
4 Houston Rockets Rick Adelman 967.6
5 Charlotte Bobcats Larry Brown 523.0
6 New York Knicks Mike D'Antoni 519.0
7 Orlando Magic Stan Van Gundy 486.6
8 Cleveland Cavaliers Mike Brown 421.8
9 Dallas Mavericks Rick Carlisle 276.0
10 New Orleans Hornets Byron Scott 217.6
11 Chicago Bulls Vinny Del Negro 200.0
12 Detroit Pistons Michael Curry 200.0
13 Miami Heat Erik Spoelstra 200.0
14 Denver Nuggets George Karl 109.8
15 Sacramento Kings Reggie Theus 106.6
16 New Jersey Nets Lawrence Frank 86.4
17 Boston Celtics Doc Rivers 74.8
18 Milwaukee Bucks Scott Skiles 0.0
19 Indiana Pacers Jim O'Brien -14.4
20 Philadelphia 76ers Maurice Cheeks -85.2
21 Memphis Grizzlies Marc Iavaroni -85.4
22 Portland Trail Blazers Nate McMillan -157.0
23 Phoenix Suns Terry Porter -180.0
24 Golden State Warriors Don Nelson -205.8
25 Toronto Raptors Sam Mitchell -237.6
26 Washington Wizards Eddie Jordan -465.0
27 Minnesota Timberwolves Randy Wittman -538.8
28 Oklahoma City Thunder P.J. Carlesimo -632.4
29 Atlanta Hawks Mike Woodson -633.6
30 Los Angeles Clippers Mike Dunleavy -686.0

REAL COACH RATINGS SUB RATINGS
COACHES RANKED BY REGULAR SEASON EXPERIENCE SUB RATING
This is the same team score (0.3 points per game with the current team) plus the score for up to 600 games (1 point a game) plus the score for between 600 and 1,000 games (0.2 points per game)

1 Utah Jazz Jerry Sloan 1157.3
2 San Antonio Spurs Gregg Popovich 947.0
3 Los Angeles Clippers Mike Dunleavy 803.0
4 Denver Nuggets George Karl 765.8
5 Los Angeles Lakers Phil Jackson 753.8
6 Golden State Warriors Don Nelson 729.2
7 Boston Celtics Doc Rivers 711.8
8 Houston Rockets Rick Adelman 704.6
9 New Orleans Hornets Byron Scott 701.6
10 Portland Trail Blazers Nate McMillan 682.0
11 Charlotte Bobcats Larry Brown 680.0
12 Washington Wizards Eddie Jordan 630.0
13 Philadelphia 76ers Maurice Cheeks 620.8
14 Milwaukee Bucks Scott Skiles 532.0
15 Oklahoma City Thunder P.J. Carlesimo 511.6
16 Dallas Mavericks Rick Carlisle 492.0
17 New Jersey Nets Lawrence Frank 478.4
18 Indiana Pacers Jim O'Brien 446.6
19 New York Knicks Mike D'Antoni 439.0
20 Toronto Raptors Sam Mitchell 426.4
21 Atlanta Hawks Mike Woodson 426.4
22 Minnesota Timberwolves Randy Wittman 325.2
23 Cleveland Cavaliers Mike Brown 319.8
24 Orlando Magic Stan Van Gundy 291.6
25 Sacramento Kings Reggie Theus 224.6
26 Memphis Grizzlies Marc Iavaroni 224.6
27 Chicago Bulls Vinny Del Negro 200.0
28 Detroit Pistons Michael Curry 200.0
29 Miami Heat Erik Spoelstra 200.0
30 Phoenix Suns Terry Porter 200.0

Jerry Sloan is the most experienced coach.

In terms of raw experience, Mr. Karl is slightly ahead of Mr. Jackson! And Mr. Karl is a little ahead of Don Nelson, despite fewer games overall, because of the relatively long term he has coached the Nuggets, versus a shorter term for Mr. Nelson coaching the Warriors.

Doc Rivers has more experience than most people think.

Notice that all rookie coaches start with an experience score of 200.

COACHES RANKED BY REGULAR SEASON SUB RATING
This is the regular season wins score minus the regular season losses score. The average score is intentionally below zero, which reflects the reality that most coaches must win more than they lose within 2-5 years or they will be bounced out of the NBA head coaching roster. However, very highly experienced coaches, coaches who have been notably successful in the playoffs at one time, and coaches who have done a lot better recently are all likely exceptions to the do well in the regular season or get fired within 2-5 years rule.

1 Los Angeles Lakers Phil Jackson 1954
2 San Antonio Spurs Gregg Popovich 1046
3 Houston Rockets Rick Adelman 479
4 Utah Jazz Jerry Sloan 426
5 New York Knicks Mike D'Antoni 131
6 Orlando Magic Stan Van Gundy 99
7 Denver Nuggets George Karl 97
8 Cleveland Cavaliers Mike Brown 18
9 Chicago Bulls Vinny Del Negro 0
10 Detroit Pistons Michael Curry 0
11 Miami Heat Erik Spoelstra 0
12 Dallas Mavericks Rick Carlisle -72
13 Sacramento Kings Reggie Theus -118
14 Charlotte Bobcats Larry Brown -154
15 Golden State Warriors Don Nelson -278
16 New Jersey Nets Lawrence Frank -284
17 Phoenix Suns Terry Porter -296
18 Memphis Grizzlies Marc Iavaroni -310
19 Indiana Pacers Jim O'Brien -338
20 Milwaukee Bucks Scott Skiles -352
21 Toronto Raptors Sam Mitchell -520
22 Philadelphia 76ers Maurice Cheeks -529
23 Boston Celtics Doc Rivers -601
24 New Orleans Hornets Byron Scott -712
25 Washington Wizards Eddie Jordan -801
26 Portland Trail Blazers Nate McMillan -815
27 Minnesota Timberwolves Randy Wittman -864
28 Oklahoma City Thunder P.J. Carlesimo -973
29 Atlanta Hawks Mike Woodson -1024
30 Los Angeles Clippers Mike Dunleavy -1510

Any positive number is respectable. Mr. Karl is 7th in terms of regular season performance: nothing to write home about really but undeniably respectable.

The rookies of course start with zero.

Mr. Dunleavy has been with the Clippers for many years, who for many years were the doormats of the West. Come on Marcus Camby, give Dunleavy some wins and make me look good for backing you up in the face of the Nene mania!

COACHES RATED BY THE MOST IMPORTANT SUB RATING OF ALL: THE NET PLAYOFFS SUB RATING
This consists of the playoffs experience score (3 points per playoff game) plus the playoffs wins score (21 points per win) plus the playoffs losses score (30 points per loss)

1 Los Angeles Lakers Phil Jackson 2364
2 San Antonio Spurs Gregg Popovich 831
3 New Orleans Hornets Byron Scott 228
4 Orlando Magic Stan Van Gundy 96
5 Cleveland Cavaliers Mike Brown 84
6 Los Angeles Clippers Mike Dunleavy 21
7 Chicago Bulls Vinny Del Negro 0
8 Detroit Pistons Michael Curry 0
9 Miami Heat Erik Spoelstra 0
10 Sacramento Kings Reggie Theus 0
11 Memphis Grizzlies Marc Iavaroni 0
12 Minnesota Timberwolves Randy Wittman 0
13 Charlotte Bobcats Larry Brown -3
14 Portland Trail Blazers Nate McMillan -24
15 Boston Celtics Doc Rivers -36
16 Atlanta Hawks Mike Woodson -36
17 New York Knicks Mike D'Antoni -51
18 Phoenix Suns Terry Porter -84
19 New Jersey Nets Lawrence Frank -108
20 Indiana Pacers Jim O'Brien -123
21 Dallas Mavericks Rick Carlisle -144
22 Toronto Raptors Sam Mitchell -144
23 Oklahoma City Thunder P.J. Carlesimo -171
24 Philadelphia 76ers Maurice Cheeks -177
25 Milwaukee Bucks Scott Skiles -180
26 Houston Rockets Rick Adelman -216
27 Washington Wizards Eddie Jordan -294
28 Utah Jazz Jerry Sloan -306
29 Golden State Warriors Don Nelson -657
30 Denver Nuggets George Karl -753

Phil Jackson and Greg Popovich are hogging the vast majority of the positive points.

Doc Rivers needs a lot more playoff wins to get his sub rating up there. If the Celtics fail to repeat this year, could it be because the Celtics this year need more coaching from Rivers and less from themselves? Have the other teams figured out the Celtics relatively simple coaching now? Are the other teams, as Rivers himself said the other day, going after the Celtics in an intense and smart way from the opening tip? If the Celtics fail to at least make it to the Championship, Rivers will be at least partly to blame.

Oh my dear Lord, Mr. Karl... You are dead last. What a shame. Yes it's true, Mr. Karl is the worst Coach in the NBA as far as playoffs are concerned!

Mr. Karl's poor playoff record (62-83) is normally the kind of record that you would associate with coaches who have poor regular season records as well, which is to say that you would associate it with coaches who were bounced out of the NBA head coaching ranks after 2-5 years or so. But Mr. Karl soldiers on, the ultimate regular season only warrior.

Notice finally that although Mr. Karl is the basket case, he is not the only one who has been hammered by the likes of Phil Jackson and Greg Popovich in the playoffs. Jerry Sloan and Rick Adelman have taken more than their share of licks from Jackson and Popovich over the years. Will this finally be the year when Adelman, Sloan, or both overcome both Jackson and Popovich? Stay tuned.

Finally, there is a supplementary sub rating called the Grand Total Experience Sub Rating. This is simply the sum of all three factors making up the regular season experience sub rating and the playoff experience factor score. In the main breakdown, the playoff experience score goes into the Net Playoffs Sub Rating, not into the Regular Season Experience Sub Rating.

1 Utah Jazz Jerry Sloan 1718.3
2 Los Angeles Lakers Phil Jackson 1584.8
3 San Antonio Spurs Gregg Popovich 1427.0
4 Charlotte Bobcats Larry Brown 1247.0
5 Golden State Warriors Don Nelson 1227.2
6 Denver Nuggets George Karl 1200.8
7 Houston Rockets Rick Adelman 1136.6
8 Los Angeles Clippers Mike Dunleavy 1016.0
9 New Orleans Hornets Byron Scott 857.6
10 Boston Celtics Doc Rivers 834.8
11 Portland Trail Blazers Nate McMillan 730.0
12 Washington Wizards Eddie Jordan 708.0
13 Dallas Mavericks Rick Carlisle 678.0
14 Philadelphia 76ers Maurice Cheeks 668.8
15 Milwaukee Bucks Scott Skiles 637.0
16 New Jersey Nets Lawrence Frank 592.4
17 New York Knicks Mike D'Antoni 592.0
18 Oklahoma City Thunder P.J. Carlesimo 547.6
19 Indiana Pacers Jim O'Brien 539.6
20 Toronto Raptors Sam Mitchell 459.4
21 Cleveland Cavaliers Mike Brown 457.8
22 Atlanta Hawks Mike Woodson 447.4
23 Orlando Magic Stan Van Gundy 405.6
24 Minnesota Timberwolves Randy Wittman 325.2
25 Sacramento Kings Reggie Theus 224.6
26 Memphis Grizzlies Marc Iavaroni 224.6
27 Phoenix Suns Terry Porter 215.0
28 Chicago Bulls Vinny Del Negro 200.0
29 Detroit Pistons Michael Curry 200.0
30 Miami Heat Erik Spoelstra 200.0

Fast Break: The Pistons Disagree with George Karl and the Nuggets Regarding Allen Iverson--By How Much We Don't Yet Know

If the Pistons were giving Iverson 100% freedom as the Nuggets did, then they would have maintained his shooting guard position. So we already know that changes are afoot. But we do not know yet what they have directed and we don't know yet to what extent they will avoid falling into what I call the "Iverson two point guard trap."

The Pistons and Iverson have stated that the plan is for "Iverson to be Iverson." Do not be fooled. That is a big media throw away line that sounds nice but that really does not mean much. In sports as in politics, what the public line is is often nothing more than a "false flag." Do you think that the Pistons brass are going to tell the public exactly how they are using Iverson and exactly what he has been told? Do you think they would reveal their exact strategy to the public and thus to the other 29 teams? For that matter, do you think Iverson would give you that? No, they are not going to reveal those details.

The only way to find out what the Pistons have told Iverson to do is to carefully track statistics, including ones never seen before, to see to what extent Iverson's game changes from the Sixers and the Nuggets. Which is of course exactly what I will be doing.

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

Fast Break: A Message to George Karl and the Nuggets: Stop Blaming Your Mistakes on Allen Iverson

George Karl and the Nuggets gave Allen Iverson 100% freedom to continue to put up as many shots as he wanted. One way we know this for sure is that his position was shooting guard for the whole time he was on the Nuggets. Another way we know for certain is that Karl in interviews said that an ultra great, "special" player such as Iverson should not be and does not need to be coached to any extent and does not have to be instructed to change much of anything. During the few times he was technically assigned to point guard, it was only because all or at least all remotely competitive point guards were unavailable, so it was only by default and by accident in other words.

Whether or not the Nuggets are secretly crying the blues about their failed Iverson pure shooting guard strategy, they are certainly not going to look weak or incompetent by even hinting any regrets in public. Rather, they are trying to fool the public by blaming the problems that occurred with their strategy using a cheap bait and switch type of ploy. They are trying to argue that the problems were Allen Iverson's fault because he was not a very good point guard!

Sorry, but it was thanks to you Nuggets, that Iverson was not given the opportunity to adjust his game for the point guard role in a situation that cried out for that strategy. It was your choice and your mistake, not his. So live with it, and stop lying to the public about Iverson being the point guard while with the Nuggets. Let me emphasize because this is historically important: the blame for the Nuggets not reaching their potential while Iverson was on their team with no doubt whatsoever lies with George Karl and the other coaches and managers of this team, not with Allen Iverson.

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

Fast Break: The George Karl Knock Against Iverson is a Disgrace and Nothing More than Part of a Karl Career Building Scheme

George Karl is at it again; he has once again tried to blame his inability to coach in a quality way on a player who by default was doing some coaching for himself. This time he has criticized the obvious target, a player who just left the team more for financial reasons than basketball reasons actually: he has made false claims while knocking Allen Iverson.

If you read The Quest for the Ring you see through this ploy immediately. I have been telling you about this crucial controversy for many months. I told you this: Karl refused to direct Iverson in any way. He is either unwilling to, unable to, or both, to direct any of his historic players in any significant way. A perverse advantage of what actually may be a clever scheme by Karl is that when things don't work out optimally he can blame things on the player (who is making all of the decisions) rather than on himself. There is some evidence that he has been using this career climbing or career maintenance scheme for many, many years. In my opinion this is not only negligence but it is also disgraceful and very, very cheap.

Moreover, it is very disturbing how many Nuggets fans who have circled the wagons and rallied around the scaled back and shrunken Nuggets following Billups for Iverson are pretending that coaches are not allowed to or are unable to have any impact on how their players and teams play. They are pretending in effect that "quality players can always coach themselves." And they are also pretending that Iverson would not have changed anything had he been asked or ordered.

It's uncool to openly support Karl of course, but a lot of the Nuggets fans are indirectly supporting Karl by giving him a pass on his huge Iverson blunder. Those fans need to live in the real world of competitive franchises, where players are not 100% free to do whatever they want. That includes Kobe Bryant: he gets instructions from Phil Jackson quite often. Nuggets fans are kind of sad when they live in Karl's world, where historic, great players can not be instructed or directed at all and are allowed virtually 100% freedom to do whatever they want.

And meanwhile, younger, inconsistent players such as J.R. Smith are overlorded, over managed, and generally harassed by Karl.

So yes, what I said recently is true: Iverson was punked by Karl and the Nuggets. All players deserve a boost from quality coaching and he didn't get one. Then he got the kick in the rear from Karl on his way out.

The headline for this latest Karl outburst against a player in the Denver Post is: Point guard praise: Billups over A.I.

This is an ultra cheap and unsportsmanlike shot, and this is a disgraceful lie posing as real information. The Nuggets organization and the Denver media are trying to, and succeeding in, largely, because most fans do not follow the Nuggets closely enough to see through this, create the belief that Iverson was not a good point guard and that is why he had to be traded and that is why everyone is so happy now that Billups is on the team. This is nothing more than garbage. Iverson was treated as a pure shooting guard from start to finish by Karl and the Nuggets. So now we have the Denver Post joining all the common Joes who foolishly criticize Iverson for being a poor point guard while he is not playing that position.

Jeesh, this is why the open community internet is so important. You go to independent forums and web logs to get the real truth about things, because you are only going to get a lot of manure shoveled into your brain if you try to get informed from big Corporation sites such as the Denver Post.

Editorial Note: Please be aware that a "Fast Break" is a short and quick preview of some of the topics that will be explored and proved in more detail in upcoming regular reports. Fast Breaks will often reappear in full reports with only minor reediting, but there will be more important details, more evidence, and more implications and explanations in the full reports. Moreover, there will be topics that never appear in any Fast Break in a full Report.

Fast Breaks are especially useful for the first few days after major news breaks. They are also very useful for people who will seldom or never have enough time to read a full Game/Team/League Report. Fast Breaks are the type of article that more typical web logs feature almost all or all of the time.

Real Coach Ratings for the 30 NBA Head Coaches: the First Ever

REAL COACH RATINGS
As of October, 2008, before the 2008-09 season began
A User Guide Follows

1 Los Angeles Lakers Phil Jackson 5071.8
2 San Antonio Spurs Gregg Popovich 2824.0
3 Utah Jazz Jerry Sloan 1277.3
4 Houston Rockets Rick Adelman 967.6
5 Charlotte Bobcats Larry Brown 523.0
6 New York Knicks Mike D'Antoni 519.0
7 Orlando Magic Stan Van Gundy 486.6
8 Cleveland Cavaliers Mike Brown 421.8
9 Dallas Mavericks Rick Carlisle 276.0
10 New Orleans Hornets Byron Scott 217.6
11 Chicago Bulls Vinny Del Negro 200.0
12 Detroit Pistons Michael Curry 200.0
13 Miami Heat Erik Spoelstra 200.0
14 Denver Nuggets George Karl 109.8
15 Sacramento Kings Reggie Theus 106.6
16 New Jersey Nets Lawrence Frank 86.4
17 Boston Celtics Doc Rivers 74.8
18 Milwaukee Bucks Scott Skiles 0.0
19 Indiana Pacers Jim O'Brien -14.4
20 Philadelphia 76ers Maurice Cheeks -85.2
21 Memphis Grizzlies Marc Iavaroni -85.4
22 Portland Trail Blazers Nate McMillan -157.0
23 Phoenix Suns Terry Porter -180.0
24 Golden State Warriors Don Nelson -205.8
25 Toronto Raptors Sam Mitchell -237.6
26 Washington Wizards Eddie Jordan -465.0
27 Minnesota Timberwolves Randy Wittman -538.8
28 Oklahoma City Thunder P.J. Carlesimo -632.4
29 Atlanta Hawks Mike Woodson -633.6
30 Los Angeles Clippers Mike Dunleavy -686.0

USER GUIDE FOR THE REAL COACH RATINGS
I am proud and pleased to present what is probably the world's first serious effort to rate and rank all of the current NBA head coaches. Why should the coaches hide behind a black curtain? Concerning coaches, there is virtually a total lack of the kind of statistical comparing and contrasting that goes on with players 24/7. I for one think it is way overdue that coaches be fairly and systematically compared and contrasted.

I can pretty much guarantee you that no one has ever, even with the capabilities created by the internet age, put in as much effort and thought as I have into fairly comparing NBA coaches with widely different lengths of time spent in professional head coaching. And this system CAN be used in other Leagues, other countries, and on other planets. If there are any other basketball planets, that is!

As I was working on this I often had a sinking feeling that trying to fairly compare coaches with more than 10 years of experience with those with less than 2 years experience would be in the end impossible. But I persevered and scrapped and fought my way to the goal line and got it done. I achieved all of the balancing that I needed to achieve. Specifically, for example, I kept the points given for experience within reason, while making sure that regular season and playoff losses were penalized to the full extent they should be.

You must keep in mind that any coach who has been fired for not winning enough in the regular season, for not winning enough in the playoffs, or for both, and has not been rehired by another team, is not on this list. We don't care about them. The whole idea in multi-billion dollar professional sports is to win more than you lose, and that most obviously and most definitely includes the coaches. So a 50/50 record in either the regular season or in the playoffs is not good enough long term, and coaches who are not better than .500 get fired and not rehired sooner or later, and those who have met that fate already are not on this list.

To reflect the reality that coaches who can not win more than they lose are sooner or later going to be fired, and will most likely never advance in the playoffs before they are fired, it is necessary to make sure that losses entail a bigger negative number than do wins entail a positive number. But we have to avoid getting carried away. So when I add in the amount given for experience, the apparent gap between the award for winning and the penalty for losing is shrunk down to a reasonably small amount.

In the case of all coaches who have coached fewer than 600 games (which is currently 19 out of 30 of them) since a full point is given for every regular season game for just the experience factor, and since the award for a regular season win is 5 points, and since the penalty for a regular season loss is minus 7 points, these younger, less experienced coaches break even just by achieving a 50/50 regular season record. But heck, they are learning. And if they learn the right things, than they might become the next Phil Jackson or Rick Adelman!

Coaches who have coached more than 600 games must do a little better than .500 in the regular season to achieve a net positive toward their overall Real Coach Ratings. The numerical details will be presented below.

The rating system demands a little bit more from all coaches, regardless of experience, for the playoffs. All the coaches must do a little better than .500 in the playoffs to get a net positive score toward their Real Coach Ratings. Once again, the numerical details will be presented below, in the section that begins "True Net Scores..."

BE CAREFUL REGARDING THE VERY LARGE TIME SCALE OF THESE RATINGS
Keep in mind that each coach is rated using information from every season that he has been a head coach in the NBA. It is very plausible that some of the coaches will currently be substantially better or substantially worse than their overall career ratings indicate.

But while I am on this subject, I want to warn you to not make the assumption that all or even most coaches get better as they accumulate more and more experience. There is no empirical evidence I know of to back that up, and nor is it in my view obvious or even likely to be true most or much of the time. It is plausible that coaches do not really improve that much after roughly 5 or 6 years of experience. It is also plausible that some of the heaviest experience coaches have not completely updated their beliefs and coaching schemes to reflect the current ways of basketball. They may be hurting their teams a little or even a lot by persisting with strategies and tactics that used to work well years ago but are not working very well in the NBA in 2008.

CERTAIN VETERAN PLAYERS CAN COACH THEMSELVES TO A LARGE EXTENT
Always keep in mind that older, more veteran teams can coach themselves to one extent or another, particularly if the roster is both highly skilled and highly experienced. It doesn't matter who comes up with the winning schemes and patterns; what matters is that someone does. Younger teams, however, always need a good coaching staff to make headway in the playoffs.

Quest for the Ring has gone on record claiming that the 2007-08 Champion Boston Celtics are a good example of a team that could coach itself well to a large extent.

POSITIVE FACTORS THAT AFFECT REAL COACH RATINGS
1. Number of Regular Season Games Coached: The Experience Factor:
One Point is given for each regular season game coached up to 600 games, which is almost 7 1/2 seasons worth of games. If a Coach has not learned just about everything he needs to by this point, he most likely never will, so the award for experience is sharply reduced for all games coached beyond 600. 0.2 points is given for games 601 through 1,000. Nothing at all is given for any games coached beyond 1,000 games.

What about rookie and near rookie coaches? Just because they have never coached in the NBA, should their experience rating be zero? No, I don't believe so. They either have substantial coaching experience in other Leagues, or they were extremely talented and/or intelligent players, or both, or else they would not have been hired to be a head Coach in the NBA. So any coach who has coached for fewer than 200 games is given exactly 200 points for experience. So rookie coaches start out with Real Coach Ratings of 200.

Calculations indicate that the average Real Coach Rating is currently 321.4. So the objective of all rookie coaches must be to increase their starting rating of 200 to at least the average rating among of all coaches (321) as soon as they can do so. You can think of the range between 0 and 321 as "the proving ground" or even the "make it or break it range" for coaches. Most coaches who drop below zero instead of going up from 200 during their first 3-6 years will be bounced out of the NBA.

Coaches who have ratings below 200 and especially coaches who have ratings below zero should be fired unless the managers and owners involved are sure that the coach has not had competitive players to work with, or are sure that the coach is getting better at his job, or if there is some other unusual mitigating factor.

Coaches who persist as coaches with Real Player Ratings below 200, and especially with Real Coach Ratings below zero, are frequently going to be men who have very cordial relations with the managers and owners. In other words, they are being kept on the payroll because the managers and/or the owners involved personally like the coach in question enough to brush aside any concerns about whether that coach is doing a good enough job for their team. These dubious coaches are given the benefit of the doubt, in other words, or sort of a free pass.

It is also true that some managers and owners live in fear that they might go from bad to worse if they exchange one coach for another. They simply do not have enough courage to strike out and try a rookie or a near-rookie coach, or to pick up a coach who has been fired by another team but who deserves a second chance.

But back to the factors we go:
2. Number of Playoff Season Games Coached: the Playoff Experience Factor:
Three points are awarded for every playoff game coached regardless of result. The limit is going to be 300 such games. Only Phil Jackson, who has coached a mind boggling 277 playoff games, has any chance of coming up to the limit any time soon.

3. Number of Games Coached With Current Team:
This is a supplementary experience score which credits coaches who have gone the longest without being fired by their current teams. The points given are 0.3 for all games coached with the team the Coach is currently working for.

The one side of the coin regarding this is that the coach must be doing what the organization wants to avoid being fired, and he can't be a total failure basketball wise, so he deserves credit in proportion to how long he has kept his post. The other side of the coin is that the more experience a Coach has with a particular team, the more valuable he is to that franchise, because he knows everybody and everything concerned with the franchise better and better with each passing year. Generally speaking, the more successive games a Coach has coached with the same team, the more effectively and efficiently he can help the team squeeze out wins that would otherwise be losses. Jerry Sloan, who coming in to 2008-09 had coached a mind boggling 1,591 games for the Jazz, is the ultimate example of a Coach who due to his many years with the same team is going to be more effective and efficient than he would be if he had just switched to a different team. Due partly to this factor, do not be surprised if the Jazz become a losing team shortly after Sloan finally retires.

Another name for this factor might be "franchise specific experience." This year the Dallas Mavericks hired a new head Coach, Rick Carlisle, who has a lot of prior experience with other teams. But he is brand new to the Mavericks, so be careful not to expect miracles or even to assume that his coaching is going to be as good as it has been in the past from the get go. Look instead for the Mavericks to get better and better as the season goes along. Because Carlisle needs time to merge his skills and abilities with the specific factors involved with making the Mavericks a playoff winner.

4. Regular Season Wins
5 points per regular season win.

5. Playoff Wins:
21 points per playoff win. A little more than half the teams make the playoffs. Theoretically, unless he is stuck with a truly lousy roster, any truly good coach can get his team into the playoffs. For a good coach, it really is not much of an accomplishment at all. But only the really good coaches can win in the playoffs. In the NBA, the regular season is quite honestly nothing more than the preseason for the "playoff season," which is the season which really matters when all is said and done.

Also, obviously, playoff games are generally more intense in all respects: individual players, team play as a whole, and coaching efforts made.

For all of these reasons, it is necessary to factor playoff games as being worth at least 4 times as much as regular season games.

NEGATIVE FACTORS THAT AFFECT REAL COACH RATINGS
1. Regular Season Losses:
7 points is charged for each regular season loss.

2. Playoff Losses:
30 points is charged for each playoff loss.

Now there will be some who leap out of their seats and say "this guy is off his rocker" when they see that the penalty for losing a playoff gamee is 30 points. I can assure you, ye of little faith, that I know exactly what I am doing and that this is precisely correct. I have already explained why playoff games must be valued at at least 4 times the valuation put on regular season games. A regular season loss is 7 points, and 4 times 7 is 28, and 30 is only marginally more than 28.

Moreover, consider the true underlying net positive and negative scores, which you get by combining the experience award and the winning or losing number:

TRUE NET SCORES COMBINING EXPERIENCE AND EVENT SCORES TOGETHER
Regular Season Win: 6 Points. But it is 5.2 points for coaches with between 600 and 1,000 games coached and it is 5 points for coaches with more than 1,000 games coached.

Regular Season Loss: Minus 6 Points. But it is minus 6.8 points for coaches with between 600 and 1,000 games coached and minus 7 points for coaches with more than 1,000 games coached.

Can you see what I think is the genius of this system? The more experienced coaches get experience points that obviously are not available to less experienced coaches. To partially or in some cases completely offset what would otherwise be an unfair advantage in the rating system, the more experienced coaches are expected to do somewhat better in winning and losing in order to achieve a net positive from their winning and losing toward their ratings. This is a primary mechanism used here that tends to even the playing field between coaches of widely differing amounts of experience, without being unfair to any type of coach. This whole project would have been largely a waste of time if I didn't have a good and fair way of varying the treatment of coaches with radically different amounts of experience, in this way.

Now here are the true net scores for playoff games:
Playoff Win: 24 points.

Playoff Loss: Minus 27 points.

Recall that all coaches get 3 points for experience for each playoff game. So you should be able to confirm these numbers.

Are these factore set in stone forever and ever? No, but adjustments will be few, far between, and minor in the coming months and years. And although this is not a perfect system, it is at the very least a very good system. And it is light years ahead of having no system at all with which to fairly compare coaches of radically differing amounts of professional basketball head coach experience.

Real Team Ratings: Very Early in the Season: as of November 14, 2008

REAL TEAM RATINGS
As of November 14, 2008
The User Guide Follows the Ratings

1 Los Angeles Lakers 21.9
2 Atlanta Hawks 12.2
3 Boston Celtics 10.6
4 Orlando Magic 10.4
5 Utah Jazz 9.9
6 Cleveland Cavaliers 9.1
7 Indiana Pacers 8.1
8 Miami Heat 6.0
9 Detroit Pistons 5.6
10 Houston Rockets 4.6
11 New Orleans Hornets 4.1
12 Philadelphia 76ers 3.9
13 Phoenix Suns 2.4
14 Chicago Bulls 2.1
15 Denver Nuggets 1.4
16 New York Knicks 1.2
17 Milwaukee Bucks 0.8
18 Toronto Raptors -1.4
19 Golden State Warriors -4.0
20 Portland Trail Blazers -4.9
21 Dallas Mavericks -5.3
22 Memphis Grizzlies -5.6
23 San Antonio Spurs -6.3
24 Charlotte Bobcats -6.9
25 Minnesota Timberwolves -7.5
26 Oklahoma City Thunder -7.9
27 Sacramento Kings -8.7
28 New Jersey Nets -9.0
29 Washington Wizards -9.5
30 Los Angeles Clippers -16.0

USER GUIDE FOR REAL TEAM RATINGS
Last updated November 15, 2008

This is the most accurate ranking possible. The factors and the exact formulas used are a Nuggets 1 trade secret, like the recipe to Kentucky Fried Chicken. But I will give you a few hints. These rankings start with all-inclusive offensive and defensive efficiency statistics that are adjusted for pace. We then adjust for schedule difficulty.

We then carefully overweight a little for the quality of a team's defending, which is at a premium in the playoffs. Due to defending being overweighted, the overall team ratings are NOT simply a report on how well the teams have done this season. We are trying to make sure that our rating tells you exactly how well each team is projected to do in the playoffs.

THE LATER IN THE SEASON IT IS THE MORE ROCK SOLID THE RATINGS ARE
The earlier in the season it is, the less reliable the ratings are, because the schedule adjustment, which is not totally scientific, is a much larger factor earlier than it is later in the season. Real Team Ratings after January 1 and especially after February 1 are going to be substantially more rock solid than those coming before the end of the year.

PREDICT FOR KNOWLEDGE OR FUN BUT DO NOT GAMBLE ANY MONEY
Do not under any circumstances use these ratings to gamble with valuable money by betting on the outcome of games. The reasons this would be foolish are explained shortly.

You can predict games for fun but you are a fool if you think you can use these ratings or any other ratings to predict the outcome of games well enough to win money from betting money on outcomes. Do not bet any money on the outcome of basketball games. The remainder of this guide is for those who want to predict games for fun or for knowledge development.

The Real Team Rating differentials between teams can be used as crucial starting points for approximations of expected score difference when any two teams play. Though the ratings are a critical starting point, the outside factors below absolutely must be considered if you are seriously trying to predict the outcome of games in advance. Unfortunately, some of these factors are not only unavailable anywhere including here as of yet, they are difficult to estimate out of the blue, Therefore, to repeat, you should definitely not think that you can use this web site to make money by betting on basketball games. The injury, player slumps, and coaching differential factors, especially, because all of these are so hard to estimate, make it impossible to be truly accurate in predicting games.

OUTSIDE FACTORS THAT EFFECT GAMES
1. Home Court Advantage 4-6 points, depending on team.
2. Extra Rest Advantage 5-7 points
3. Injuries and Player Slumps 0-15 points, rarely more than 10 points. Player slumps are rare, and are defined as major slumps among the best 6 players on the team.
4. Coaching Quality Differential 0-9 points, rarely more than 7 points.
5. The "Human Nature Adjustment": Since it is human nature for basketball players to ease up a little bit if they have a big lead over the other team, you would be foolish to assume that large predicted differences (greater than 10 points) will actually play out in real life. A rough rule of thumb to use is to take only one half of all predicted margin of victory points above 10 as viable for the actual game. For example, suppose that after you have considered the ratings and all of the outside factors, you have an estimate that the Lakers will beat the Clippers by 40 points. You would be wise to take only 1/2 of the margin greater than 10, which would be one half of 40-10, or 1/2 of 30, which is 15, added to the 10, which yields an actual prediction of the Lakers beating the Clippers by 25 points.

FULL EXAMPLE ON PREDICTING
Team X has a Real Team Rating of 15 and Team Y has a Real Team Rating of -5. The starting point for predicting the outcome is that Team X will beat Team Y by 20. Now you estimate all the outside factors:

1. Team Y is home: the predicted team X margin of victory is reduced by 5, to 15.
2. Team Y is playing on back to back nights, while Team X is not: the predicted Team X margin of victory is increased by 6, to 21.
3. Neither team has any major player slumps. But Team X is badly banged up (-10 points) while Team Y has only one injury to a bench player (-1 point): the predicted Team X margin of victory decreases by 9, to 12.
4. The Coach of Team X is on point with hihs team better than the Coach of Team Y is with his team: the predicted Team X margin of victory increases by 3, to 15.
5. Human Nature Adjustment: the predicted margin of victory is reduced by one half of anything in excess of ten points. The predicted Team X margin of victory over Team Y is reduced from 15 to 12.5.

So in this example, the final result is that Team X is projected to beat Team Y by about 12.5 points.